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This paper examines the implications of a retailer's shelf space stocking
decisions on the optimal marketing strategies of an upstream multi-product
monopolist. When the retailer's opportunity cost of shelf space is known,
full-line forcing, brand discounts, and maximum resale price maintenance are
sufficient to achieve the monopolist manufacturer's first best profit. When
these strategies are adopted, the retailer's profit is reduced to the scarcity
rents obtainable on her shelf space. The additional downstream profit to be
made by pitting one brand versusuanother isteliminated. Whenthe retailer's
opportunity cost of shelf space is unknown, the use of aggregate rebates can
act as a screening device to maximize channel profit.
*1 am indebted to my colleague Daniel P. O'Brien for thoughtful discussion. I would also like
to thank Martin Richardson, Eitan Gerstner, Michael Waterson, and two anonymous referees for
helpful comments which led to a substantial improvement over an earlier version of this paper.
Comments from seminar participants at Vanderbilt, Georgetown, and the 1991 Marketing Science
Conference are also gratefully acknowledged. I am responsible for any remaining errors.
Retailers derive their bargaining strength vis a vis upstream suppliers partly through their
product selections. Sometimes space considerations limit the number of items that any one
retailer can carry. In this case a downstream firm's decision to stock one product necessarily
precludes her from stocking another. Thus manufacturers within and across industries are
forced to compete to secure retailer patronage.
However shelf space does not have to be scarce to be valuable. A retailer may still earn
positive rent as long as there exists at least two brands per product class. The opportunity
cost of stocking one brand includes the foregone profit from the reduced sales of all other
substitute brands. An item will be carried only if its incremental profit is non - negative.
In other words a product will not be stocked if the retailer can improve her profitability by
dropping it from her line. She cannot be forced to accept less than her opportunity cost on
any brand that she carries.
This paper examines the implications of a retailer's shelf space stocking decisions on the
optimal marketing strategy of an upstream firm. The focus is on a multi-product monopolist
who produces a line of goods in a particular product class. I find that when the retailer's
opportunity cost of shelf space is known, full-line forcing, brand discounts, and maximum
resale price maintenance are sufficient to achieve the monopolist manufacturer's first best
profit, i.e. the profit the upstream firm could make if it were vertically integrated. When
these strategies are adopted, the retailer's profit is reduced to the scarcity rents obtainable
on her shelf space. The additional downstream profit to be made by pitting one brand versus
another is eliminated. When the retailer's opportunity cost of shelf space is unknown, the
use of aggregate rebates can act as a-screening device to maximize channel profit.
From the manufacturer's perspective, the crux of the problem is that a retailer earns
positive rent on every product that she stocks. The sources for this rent can be split into two
components. The first component is the rent attributable to the scarcity of her shelf space.
Stocking a particular product precludes stocking another. The scarcity rent is the foregone
profit from the most preferred excluded product. The second component, the strategic
rent, represents the foregone profit from reduced sales of substitute brands. Any individual
manufacturer will be unable to affect the scarcity rent. However the latter component can
be eliminated by an appropriate supply contract, whenever a single manufacturer produces
the multiple brands.
Maximum resale price maintenance denotes a supplier contract that specifies a retail price
ceiling. Under this arrangement, a retailer may not sell the particular product for more than
a pre-specified amount. A multi-product manufacturer can utilize this practice to force the
retail markup on each of his products to be zero. Strategic rent is thereby eliminated.
Alternatively, a multi-product manufacturer can employ full-line forcing to achieve the
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same end. In this context, full-line forcing is taken to mean one of two things. It may
mean that the manufacturer literally requires retailers either to stock each of his products
or none at all. On the other hand, it may mean that the manufacturer has structured the
incentives in his contract in such a way that de facto full line forcing is achieved. In either
case, the retailer will be unable to collect any strategic rent since carrying a subset of the
manufacturer's products is not feasible.
Brand discounts are a third strategy available to the multi-product manufacturer. The
retailer's payment is made conditional on the number of brands she carries. The more brands
the retailer stocks, the greater her discount. Thus the retailer can be induced to accept the
entire product line. Alternatively, one can think of the retailer as being penalyzed if the
entire line is not stocked. With an appropriate choice of contract, strategic rent can be
eliminated.
Finally, aggregate rebates can be employed. This is the practice whereby downstream
firms receive a rebate, or additional discount, on total purchase volume orders which exceed
a pre-determined level. Purchases of all brands in the upstream firm's product line can be
summed to qualify for the rebate. In this case, if a retailer considers not stocking one of
the brands, she must take into account the possibly foregone rebate offer. In many cases
the upstream firm will be able to structure the incentives in such a way as to eliminate all
strategic rent.
This work is closely related to the literature on vertical control and channel profit max-
imization. In the single product case, Mathewson and Winter (1984), Jeuland and Shugan
(1983), and Moorthy (1987), have concluded that a manufacturer can eliminate successive
monopoly markups by an appropriate choice of a quantity discount schedule or a two - part
tariff. It is also well known that retail price ceilings could be employed to achieve the same
result. Here the analysis is extended to consider multiple products. One difference is that
while price ceilings continue to be sufficient to maximize channel profit, brand specific two
- part tariffs alone will not be. Instead, when shelf space opportunity costs are known, the
monopolist manufacturer maximizes channel profit either by setting a single fixed fee for all
of his products, or if he does set brand specific fixed fees, by offering his retailers further
incentives in the form of rebates or brand discounts.
Earlier work on full-line forcing has focused on price discrimination and extension of
monopoly or leverage theories. Recent papers addressing the latter case include Whinston
(1990), and Carbajo et al (1990). Under the price discrimination theory, full-line forcing
allows a firm to extract more surplus from heterogeneous consumers, Bowman (1957), and
homogeneous consumers, Burstein (1960) and Blair and Kaserman (1978). Here I ignore
upstream strategic issues, and hence the leverage theory, by assuming a lone manufacturer.
Instead full line forcing is employed to eliminate a retailer's strategic rent and thus is closest
in spirit to Burstein's "all or nothing choice" of prices.
To my knowledge, the formal theoretical literature has not considered brand discounts
or aggregate rebates. However, it has been conjectured that these practices may be anti-
competitive in that by inducing retailers to stock more of their products, manufacturers with
broad product lines can gain an unfair advantage over producers with narrow product lines.
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This paper develops an alternative explanation which suggests that an upstream firm would
employ the practices even in the absence of a rival.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section ii presents the model and notation.
Section iii derives the source of a retailer's claim on channel profits. This is termed 'strategic
rent'. Section iv considers alternative strategies that an upstream multi-product monopolist
can employ to reduce this claim. In particular I discuss full-line forcing, brand discounts,
aggregate rebates, and maximum resale price maintenance. Section v extends the basic
model by allowing retailers to differ in their opportunity costs of shelf space. Section vi
concludes the paper.
II The Model
Most contracts between manufacturers and their retailers involve terms which are nonlinear.
A particularly simple nonlinear contract is a two part tariff. Here a fixed fee is paid for the
right to stock a manufacturer's product, the retailer can then buy the product at a constant
per - unit price. Alternatively, one might observe a two - block tariff. A per - unit price is
charged for all units up to a certain quantity. Afer that the per - unit price changes and
the new price is in effect for all units thereafter. In an n - block tariff, the per unit price
changes n-1 times. Sometimes manufacturers publish a price list. Discounts are then given
if certain quantity threshholds are reached. For instance, when a threshhold is reached, a
percent discount is applied to the list price to give a new base price. This new base price
may apply either to all units, an all units quantity discount, or it may apply to just those
units beyond the threshhold, an incremental quantity discount.
Many reasons have been given for the various forms of nonlinear contracts. These include
(1) retailer buyer power, whereby a large retailer is able to obtain a lower trade price, (2)
cost related justifications, i.e. there is a fixed cost of processing an order, or there are
transportation economies of scale, (3) transference of inventory costs, (4) price discrimination
between buyers with different valuations for the upstream firm's product, and (5) channel
coordination to avoid a successive markup distortion.
In this paper I wish to focus exclusively on channel coordination when the upstream
firm produces multiple products. As such the model will be stylized to rule out the first
'See Merkin and Williams (1984), at pp. 168, and the Monopolies and Mergers Commission (1981b).
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four possibilities. Thus I consider a monopolist manufacturer who produces two goods with
constant marginal costs c1 and c2.
2 The upstream firm sells his products to a downstream
retailer who is a monopolist in her local market. The retailer can choose to stock both
products, either one alone, or neither. The goods are partial substitutes in the sense that
an increase in the retail price of one leads to an increase in consumer demand for the other.
The downstream monopolist selects the brands she will stock and sets prices to maximize
her profit. These decisions will depend on the specification of the manufacturer's contract.
With perfect foresight the upstream firm will choose his supply terms to maximize his profit,
taking into account the downstream firm's optimal behavior. These terms are offered on a
take-it or leave-it basis. Thus individual negotiations with local retailers is assumed to be
too costly for a manufacturer who sells nationally.
I will further assume that downstream entry is restricted in the short run, and that the
opportunity cost of a slot of shelf space can be taken as exogenous. There are a limited
number of shelf space slots, and a one to one correspondence exists between the number
of products stocked and the number of used slots. Finally I will approximate upstream
nonlinear pricing by restricting attention to supply contracts with fixed fees.
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Let the retail prices for substitute goods 1 and 2 be denoted by P1 and P2. Retail demand
functions D1(P,, P2), D
2(P1, P2) are differentiable, downward sloping in own price, and up-
ward sloping in the other good's price. Let (w1, F,) and (w2, F2) represent the wholesale
price and fixed fee specified by the manufacturer if goods 1 and 2 are stocked independently.
If both goods are stocked, let the manufacturer's terms be given by (w', w, F12). In this
latter case the retailer's profit is given by
x12 = (P1 - w')D
1(P,P 2 ) +(P 2 - w2)D
2 (Pi, P2) - F12.
I will assume that the second order conditions for profit maximization hold, i.e. the Hessian
matrix of the retailer's profit function is negative semi-definite.
When good 2 is not carried, the demand for good 1 is given by D1(P1, oo) where the price
of good 2 is denoted by infinity. The retailer's profit is then ir1 = (Pi - wi)D1 (P1, oo) - F1.
I will assume that demand is downward sloping and that the profit function is concave in
Pl. Define similar notation in the case where good 1 is not stocked.
Since shelf space is limited, a retailer who carries the upstream monopolist's products
necessarily foregoes carrying someone else's goods. These other manufacturers are assumed
to operate in perfectly competitive industries, and they produce products which are unrelated
to the monopolist's brands. I summarize their presence by letting s be the foregone profit
to the retailer of her most preferred excluded product. It is the opportunity cost of a shelf
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This analysis easily generalizes to n goods with the same qualitative results.31n this model, fixed fee contracts are sufficient to maximize the manufacturer's profit. Thus more general
supply contracts are not needed.
space slot. Thus the retailer's reservation profit when she stocks both brands is given by
max{7r' + s, ir2 + s, 2s). This represents the profit she could make if she dropped good 1,
good 2, or both products from her shelf. When this reservation profit exceeds 2s, the retailer
is said to earn strategic rent.
III Two - part tariff contracts and Strategic Rent
The task of this section is to show that the manufacturer does not maximize his profit
by setting brand specific two - part tariffs alone. Thus a contract which specifies (w1, F1),
(w2, F2), and (w,, wa, F1 + F2) does not yield the manufacturer's first best profit. The retailer
earns strategic rent by pitting the manufacturers' two brands against one another. She does
this by threatening not to carry his full - line of products.
Suppose the retailer stocks both brands. She will maximize w12 with respect to P1 , P2.
Let P1 = P1(wi, W2), and P2 = P2(wi, W2) be the solution. Define the maximized profit to
be H1 2 = 7r2(tAi,P 2 ,F 12).
Now suppose the retailer only stocks good 1. Her problem is to maximize r1. Let
P, = Pi(wj) be the solution and define I = ir 1(Pj, F1) to be the corresponding maximized
profit. Define similar notation in the case where only good 2 is sold.
The downstream firm will choose to carry the set of products which maximizes her profit
taking into account the opportunity cost of stocking each brand. In other words her decision
will be given by max {H2 , HI + s, ±2 + s, 2s}. Her profit can not be driven below 2s, which
is her scarcity rent on two slots of shelf space. On the other hand the retailer's profit may
be greater than 2s if the manufacturer is unable to capture all of her strategic rent.
The upstream firm's first best profit is defined to be the profit it would earn on goods
1 and 2 if it were vertically integrated. I will assume that the resulting maximized channel
profit obtained by selling both brands exceeds the opportunity cost of the two shelf space
slots. I now ask whether a vertically dis-integrated manufacturer can achieve his first best
profit via arms length contracting. The terms of any such contract will be set to meet two
objectives: channel profit maximization and extraction of the retailer's surplus. Clearly
channel profit is maximized when the wholesale prices are set equal to production marginal
cost, w; = w' = c;. The remainder of the paper is concerned with the latter objective:
capturing strategic rent.
This section considers a manufacturer who charges a fixed fee for each of his products. If
the retailer decides to carry both brands, she must pay the sum of the fixed fees. Consider
the manufacturer's problem. To induce the retailer to carry his full line, he must allow her
to earn at least as much profit by carrying both products as she would earn by carrying
only one brand, and at least as much profit by carrying both products as she would earn
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by selling neither. In other words it must be the case that H12 > max {HI + s,H2 + s, 2s}.
However the following proposition will now demonstrate that the restricted contract set is
unable to extract fully the retailer's surplus.
Proposition 1 Brand specific two - part tariff contracts are not sufficient to maximize the
manufacturer's profit.
Proof: Suppose they were sufficient. Then
w; = c;, H12 = 2s, H12 > max (H' + s,H 2 + s,2s}
This implies that HI -4- Ha < 2s and hence H' + H2 _ H K12 0. Writing this last equation
explicitly gives
-((P -ci) D& (iI,oo) - (i - ci) D (FiFj)) <0 (1)
where the restriction F + F = F12 is imposed. But examining component by component it
is seen that
(P, - ci)D'(P,, oo) > (P; - c,)D'(P, oo) > (P; - c;)D(P=, FP)
The first inequality is true by the definition of P,. Holding the price of good i constant,
the second inequality follows by observing that sales of good i must rise when good j is not
stocked. Similar reasoning holds for good j. Combining these results contradicts equation 1.
Hence the manufacturer's first best profit is not achieved. Q.E.D.
The retailer's bargaining strength arises from her discretion over brand choice. She can
simply refuse to stock either good 1 or 2, or both. Because these goods are substitutes, their
individual sales are subject to the availability of the other. In addition to the new sales it
attracts, stocking a second brand induces some consumers to switch from buying the first
brand. When both products are stocked, the total sales of the product class will be less than
the sum of the sales if each brand were stocked alone. This fact may work to the advantage
of the retailer. If restricted to brand specific two - part tariffs, the most F can extract is
good i's marginal contribution to the retailer's profit. The retailer earns strategic rent.
IV Capturing Strategic Rent
The previous section proposed that a multi-product manufacturer would be unable to recover
fully the channel profits generated by his products when he is restricted to selling to a
downstream retailer via brand specific two - part tariff contracts. This result is somewhat
surprising since intuition might suggest that this type of contracting would yield an outcome
equivalent to that which would obtain if the firms were vertically integrated. Since fixed fees
can be used to transfer surplus between industries, the double marginalization problem can
be avoided.
However the intuition is valid only for a single product industry. When there are multiple
brands per product class, a retailer may earn positive strategic rent. Her bargaining strength
arises because she can selectively choose which brands to stock. An item will be carried only
if its incremental profit is non - negative. In other words a product will not be stocked if
a retailer can improve her profitability by dropping it from her line. The crucial insight is
that adding a product to her shelf imposes an opportunity cost on her which is equal to the
sum of the foregone profit from her most preferred excluded product and the foregone profit
from the reduced sales of any substitute brand that she carries.
Therefore in order to extract more of the surplus from his retailers, the upstream firm
will need to resort to alternative supply contracts. In this section I examine full - line
forcing, maximum resale price maintenance, brand discounts and aggregate rebates. All
yield outcomes which are equivalent to vertical integration.
Full - line Forcing
Perhaps the most obvious solution to the manufacturer's problem is to require each retailer
to carry his full line of products. The upstream firm continues to charge both a wholesale
price and a fixed fee for each of his products, except now the retailer does not have the option
of selling only one of the brands. This contractual restraint is termed full -line forcing.
When full line forcing is specified, the retailer's choice will be given by max {H12,2s). It
is trivial to show that the manufacturer can then achieve his first best with wholesale prices
equal to production marginal cost and fixed fees set such that H12 = 2s.
In practice, line forcing is observed in industries such as pharmaceutics, cosmetics, toi-
letries, and perfume.4 The explanation here applies to the extent that the goods in a man-
ufacturer's product line are substitutes. Because the upstream firm need only determine
whether the downstream firm is selling both brands, the monitoring costs of this strategy
appear to be relatively low. On the other hand there are two drawbacks. First when retail-
ers differ in their opportunity cost of shelf space, the manufacturer may wish to allow some
retailers to stock a subset of his products. This is considered formally in the next section.
Second, full line forcing is a form of tying, and in the U.S., may be found to be a violation
of section 3 of the Clayton Act.
However, the latter problem can be circumvented since the manufacturer can obtain his
first best profit without expressly specifying full line forcing. For example, by setting an
appropriate single fixed fee and letting the retailer buy as much as she wants of either good,
'See th  Monopolies and Mergers Commission (1981a).
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the manufacturer can achieve full line forcing defacto.
w,=w;=c,, Fi=F2 =F12 s.t. 1112-2s
This supply contract induces the retailer to sell both brands providing l12  >H I=+s, i = 1, 2.
Comparing HI2 with II'+ s, it is seen that the retailer's decision is exactly the condition
under which a vertically integrated firm would stock the second brand, i.e. when brand j's
incremental profit contribution exceeds the retailer's opportunity cost of shelf space. By
structuring the retailer's incentives in this manner, downstream strategic rent is eliminated.
In their report on full line forcing, the Monopolies and Mergers Commission recognized
that full-line forcing could be achieved without formal specification in a contract. They
noted that incentives could be structured "... in such a way that the level of price or discount
acceptable to a customer can be obtained only when more than one of the supplier's products
is bought. When this is done there is in effect a tie even though the customer is not expressly
required to take more than one product."5 However, it was also recognized that in practice,
such pricing arrangements could be difficult to detect. If so, the antitrust concerns of the
firm are alleviated. But, as before, the single fixed fee may not give the desired flexibility
when retailers are heterogeneous.
Maximum Resale Price Maintenance
A second solution to the manufacturer's problem is to eliminate the retailer's per-unit profit
margin on each brand by setting a retail price ceiling which is equal to the transfer whole-
sale price." This type of contract is known as maximum resale price maintenance. Since
the foregone profit from reduced sales of I and 2 is now zero, the retailer's opportunity
cost of stocking a brand is simply her shelf space rent s. The manufacturer can pay her
directly for this space with a negative fixed fee, also known as a slotting allowance. Thus
the manufacturer's supply contract is given by
w; = P;(c;), w; = P;(c,c 2), F; = -s,F12 = -2s.
By setting a price ceiling, the upstream firm solves the successive monopoly markup problem
while at the same time the retailer's strategic rent is eliminated. The retailer is induced to
stock both brands since her profit is constrained to equal 2s in every case.
In practice, this strategy has advantages and disadvantages when compared to defacto
full line forcing. It may be preferable in that with maximum resale price maintenance the
burden of risk in an uncertain world is borne by the manufacturer rather than the retailer.
Thus a risk averse retailer may not be willing to pay a large single fixed fee for the right to sell
5See Monopolies and Mergers Commission (1981a) at pp 5-6.
6More generally the upstream firm would reduce the markup to cover just the downstream firm's marginal
costs.
the monopolist's brands. On the other hand, the retailer is assured of 2s if the manufacturer
chooses to impose a price ceiling.
The disadvantages of price maintenance pertain to monitoring costs and an uncertain
legal environment. When there is demand uncertainty, the manufacturer may not be able
to distinguish between low sales due to low demand, and low sales due to retailers pricing
above the ceiling. In addition the legality of the practice varies. In the U.K., the Resale
Prices Act of 1976 prohibits only fixed and minimum resale prices. However, in the U.S.,
the law does not differentiate between the various forms of price maintenance. All are per -
se illegal.7
Brand Discounts
A third option for the manufacturer is to specify payment depending on the number of
brands stocked. Such a contract would look like
w = w' = ci, F1 s.t. II' = s, F1 2 s.t. I12 = 2s
The manufacturer maximizes channel profit by choosing his wholesale prices equal to pro-
duction marginal cost and extracts the retailer's excess surplus with his fixed fee/s. If the
retailer stocks brand i, she is required to pay a fee of F,. If the retailer stocks brands i and
j, she is obligated to pay a fee of F12 . Here F12 < F 1 + F2. Hence by carrying both brands
the retailer receives a brand discount.8 This reduces her profit to the scarcity rent of her
shelf space. She will earn 2s for her slots regardless of the number of brands she carries.
This strategy differs from brand specific two - part tariffs in that the manufacturer offers
a discount to retailers who sell both brands. An example may be found in promotional
allowances given by cigarette manufacturers to vending machine owners. There individual
cigarette makers offer allowances to vending machine owners which are contingent on the
number of their brands stocked.*
In practice, implementation of this scheme may take other forms. For example, when the
non-linear price schedule is a declining multi-block tariff, or a list price discount, either all
units or incremental, offering additional incentives to a retailer who purchases both brands
is problematic. The manufacturer must be careful that the retailer doesn't qualify for an
advantageous discount simply by selling a single unit of the second brand. Instead the
manufacturer can sometimes achieve his first best profit with a volume discount or aggregate
rebate.
7The legal status of maximum resale price maintenance may soon be changed. The current legislation
before the Senate which proposes to codify the per - se illegality of resale price maintenance, has recently
been amended to exempt price ceilings.
8
This term was suggested to me by Eitan Gerstner.'See Schoenkopf d.b.a. "Vend Mark v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. (DC Pa. 1980), 1980-1
Trade Cases at p. 63241. See also 483 F. Supp. 1185.
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Aggregate Rebates
Volume discounts, sometimes known as car-load pricing, are discounts offered to a buyer
if a purchase order of sufficient size is placed. Typically sales of any item sold by the
manufacturer can be applied to a buyer's overall purchase volume. Sometimes the purchase
amounts of a buyer can be accumulated over a period of time. A retailer who exceeds the
required threshhold then qualifies for an aggregate rebate, also known as a cumulative volume
discount. Since the model abstracts from time, I do not consider the distinction between
these types.
Aggregate rebates can enable the manufacturer to capture additional surplus from his
retailers. Intuitively, incentives can be structured so that only by carrying the manufacturer's
full line will the retailer qualify for the rebate. In some cases the downstream firm's strategic
rent will be eliminated. For example, the manufacturer can offer a rebate R if the sum of
the downstream firm's purchase orders total at least
c1 (D'(A(ci,c 2),A2(ci,c 2))) + c2 (D2(i(ci, 2),a(c1 ,c)))
The idea is that if the retailer sells both brands, she will qualify for the rebate. R can
be chosen such that a retailer who sells both brands earns 12 = 2s. The pricing schedule
can then be chosen so that a retailer who only stocks one brand and who does not qualify
for the rebate will earn no more than H' = s.
This strategy may or not be sufficient to extract the retailer's surplus. One would still
have to check that a retailer who only sells brand i does indeed maximize profits by placing
an order of size c; (Di(P, oo). In other words it must not be the case that the retailer will
want to increase her purchase of i in order to qualify for the rebate.
Volume discounts and aggregate r bates appear to be quite common.1 * One advantage of
this strategy over defacto full line forcing, is that the manufacturer retains the flexibility to
sell a subset of his products to downstream firms. For example, this may be desirable when
retailers differ in their opportunity cost of shelf space. On the other hand, implementing
volume discounts and rebates may be costly in that the upstream firm is required to monitor
and record individual retailer purchases over time.
Proposition 2 Full - line forcing, maximum resale price maintenance, and brand discounts
are alternative strategies which the manufacturer can use to achieve his first best outcome.
Volume discounts and aggregate rebates may sometimes proxy for brand discounts.
10See the Monopolies and Mergers Commission (1981b).
V Differing Costs of Shelf Space
This section extends the basic model by allowing for differing opportunity costs of shelf
space. I will continue to assume that retailers are local monopolists, but that they are one of
two possible types. Let a be the fraction of firms with a low opportunity cost of shelf space.
Then (1 - a) is the fraction of firms with a high opportunity cost of shelf space. Denote
the value of i's shelf space as s;, s,, > si. I will also assume that the upstream firm cannot
distinguish between types apriori, but does know a. All other details of the model remain
the same. Additional notation will be introduced as needed.
Solving the model is straightforward but tedious. There are nine possible subcases to
consider, depending on whether the low and high cost retailer stocks zero, one, or both
brands. Clearly a type i downstream firm's decision is given by
max {H12,Hg 4- s,,[H 2 -si,2s. .
When the manufacturer sets his wholesale prices equal to production marginal cost, total
channel profit in each market can be denoted by V'
2 
= H1'2 + F12 if both brands are carried,
and V' = HI + F if good i is stocked alone.
Rather than proceed to a discussion of all nine cases, I will exclude the uninteresting
cases by imposing the restriction that V12 - V' y a. This means that the incremental
channel profit obtained by adding a second brand is assumed to exceed the opportunity cost
of shelf space for both types of retailers. In other words, if the manufacturer were vertically
integrated, he would always stock both brands. With this assumption, it is trivial to show
that the non-integrated manufacturer will follow one of three strategies. He can sell both of
his products to both retailers; he can sell both of his products to the low cost retailer only;
or he can sell both of his products to the low cost retailer, and one product to the high cost
retailer. All other cases can be shown to be strictly dominated.
The method of solution will be to consider first the maximum possible profit that the
manufacturer can earn in each of the three cases. In general this will not yield the first best
profit for the manufacturer because of the self selection constraints. That is the low cost
retailer can always mimic the high cost retailer. Thus, if there is a situation in which the
high cost retailer is just earning her opportunity cost 3h, the low cost retailer will always be
able to mimic the high cost retailer's strategy and earn sh -St.
The maximized profit from each case will then be compared to determine a global maxi-
mum. Of course, this will depend on the value of the parameters. Finally, I will discuss how
the manufacturer can implement the solution.
Case 1: Both products are carried by both types of retailers.
If the high cost retailer is to stock both products, it must be the case that H 12 2sh and
H12 -I+ sj,. Unfortunately for the upstream firm, this implies that the low cost retailer
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can always'earn excess surplus of at least 2(s, - al) by selling both products. Thus it is easy
to show that the most the manufacturer can earn is V12 - 2sh.
Case 2: Both products are carried at the low cost retailer only.
For the low cost retailer to stock both products, it must be the case that fI12 > {H' + si, 2s }.
If the high cost retailer decides not to stock the upstream firm's products, it must be the
case that the scarcity rent on her two slots exceeds the profit she would earn by stocking
one or both brands. Thus 2sh >H' 2 ,1H' + s}. Therefore one can show that the most the
manufacturer can earn by selling to the low cost outlet only is a (V12 - 2s,).
Case 3: Both products are carried at the low cost retailer, while the high cost retailer sells
only one brand. Without loss of generality, let good 1 be that brand.
The inequalities corresponding to the stocking decisions for the low and high cost retailers
respectively are given by H 2 > {H' + si, fl 2 + si,2si} and H' + sh {H 12,H2 + sh,2 sh}.
Since the low cost firm can always mimic the high cost firm by stocking only one brand, her
excess surplus must be at least sh - ag. Therefore the best the manufacturer can do is to
extract fully the surplus of the high cost type while minimizing the excess surplus of the low
cost type. Thus his maximized profit in this case is a (V12 -sh - sI) + (1 - a) (V1 - sh).
Comparing the manufacturer's profit in each of these cases, it is easily seen that the
optimal strategy will depend on the value of the parameter a. For low a, the manufacturer
will desire to sell both products to both types of retailers. For high a, the manufacturer
will desire to sell only to the low cost retailers. He effectively ignores the high cost type, as
the foregone profit to him of selling to them is too high. For intermediate ranges of a, the
manufacturer will choose his supply contract such that both products are stocked at the low
cost retailer, while the high cost firm carries only brand 1. Algebraic calculations show





V12 - V - s,'
The manufacturer's decision will also depend on the other parameters. For example, for
a given a, the manufacturer is more likely to prefer selling both products to both retailers
as ai goes to sh. As the gap between sg and sh widens, the manufacturer will choose either
case 2 or 3 depending on a. For illustration, see figures 2 and 3. In figure 2, a is fixed at .5.
As sj varies from 0 to 2, the manufacturer prefers case 3. For si > 2, the manufacturer will
sell both products to both retailers. In figure 3, a is fixed at .8. Here case 2 is preferred as
a varies from 0 to 2.25. For 2.25 < a < 2.75, case 3 maximizes profit, while for a > 2.75,
the manufacturer sells both products to both retailers.
Insert figure 2 here
Insert figure 3 here
Implementation of cases 1 and 2 proceed along the lines developed in the previous sec-
tion. The manufacturer can choose supply contracts with full line forcing, defacto full line
forcing, maximum resale price maintenance, brand discounts or even aggregate rebates. The
choice of supply contract to implement case 3 is more restricted. Clearly full line forcing is
unacceptable since case 3 calls for the high cost retailer to stock only brand 1. Maximum
resale price maintenance alone is also insufficient unless the manufacturer makes the slotting
allowance payments contingent on the number of products stocked. But this is precisely the
role of brand discounts which I have argued may be implemented in practice with aggregate
rebates.
Proposition 3 Brand discounts pareto dominate full line forcing and maximum resale price
maintenance as a means of rent extraction when the opportunity cost of shelf space varies
among retailers and when the manufacturer cannot observe the retailer types.
VI Conclusion
This paper has developed a common motive to explain why a multi-product manufacturer
may resort to full - line forcing, brand discounts, aggregate rebates, or maximum resale price
maintenance as part of his marketing strategy. Such practices shift surplus to the upstream
firm and enable it to achieve its first best profit when retailers' opportunity costs of shelf
space are known.
Somewhat surprisingly, brand specific two - part tariff contracts were found to be insuf-
ficient to maximize a manufacturer's profit. The intuition one has from the single product
case breaks down when a firm produces multiple products. Since a retailer can selectively
choose which brands to stock, and since the opportunity cost of stocking an additional brand
includes the foregone profit from the reduced sales of substitute brands, the downstream firm
will be able to earn strategic rent. Therefore brand specific two-part tariffs will not extract
Case 3 is preferred when
Case 2 is preferred when
V"2 -V*-sh V' - sh
V12 -V'-si < V* - s
a>V's
These findings are illustrated in figure 1. The parameters were set at V 2 = 10, V1 = 6,
sh = 3, and si = 2. As a varies from 0 to .5, the manufacturer maximizes profit in case 1.
For .5 < a < .75, profit is maximized in case 3. For a > .75, the manufacturer prefers to
sell only to the low cost retailer.
Insert figure 1 here
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the entire surplus generated by the upstream firm's products. This provided the impetus for
the additional supply contracts considered in section iv.
In an effort to distinguish between the practices, I then considered the case where retailers
differed in their opportunity cost of shelf space. Depending on the fraction of high to low
cost retailers, and on the absolute cost advantage, it was found that the manufacturer may
want to sell both of his products to both types of retailers, both of his products to the low
cost retailer only, or both of his products to the low cost retailer and one product to the
high cost retailer. Of the identified marketing strategies, only brand discounts and aggregate
rebates were sufficient to maximize upstream profit in this latter scenario. Intuitively, these
supply contracts do better because they amount to offering self selecting two - part tariffs
which effectively segment the high and low cost retailers.
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